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Executive Summary
Over the past 20 years, the reinsurance industry has experienced three profound forces for change. First, 
technological change has improved information distribution and strengthened connections between global 
markets. Second, regulatory emphasis on global equivalence in trading practices has generated pressure for 
convergence across different marketplaces. Third, the widespread acceptance of vendor property catastrophe 
models has led to more standardised approaches to the evaluation of reinsurance risks, levelling the playing  
field for decision-making on at least some classes of business.
These changes have intensified competition between reinsurance markets. Reinsurance trading centres in remote 
geographic locations, such as Bermuda, where it is more difficult to transact business face-to-face, have been 
able to write risk via electronic communications and now have very significant positions in the global reinsurance 
market. Simultaneously, Lloyd’s of London, one of the original reinsurance markets that is still very much based 
on the face-to-face approach, has demonstrated its capability to weather financial shocks and downturns and 
remains an important player in global reinsurance. 
These market-level changes are having two main effects on the practice of trading risk:
•  They alter the basis of risk-pricing and decision-making from intuitive, face-based judgement to mathematical 
   modelling and ostensibly objective decision criteria;
•  They shift the relationships that characterise the reinsurance market from individual, personal ties to more 
   strategic business-to-business relationships. 
However, there has been little systematic evaluation of the specific implications of change for either trading 
practices or for future industry evolution. This report addresses that gap by presenting the results of an  
industry-commissioned, year-long study of reinsurance underwriting and broking practices in the Lloyd’s and 
Bermuda marketplaces.
The generic findings show that a market built around a central physical location, such as Lloyd’s, is valuable  
for business that requires face-to-face contact at the point of decision-making. However, much business can  
be transacted through selective use of face-to-face interaction at prior stages in the process, rather than at the 
‘point-of-sale’. Bermuda is an example of such a ‘transportable’ reinsurance market; markets can be established 
where regulatory and taxation conditions are favourable rather than necessarily being bound to a particular 
physical location. 
The specific findings show how the selective use of face-to-face and electronic interaction can reduce 
inefficiencies and improve decision quality in either type of market. 
The report covers four main areas. The findings in Section 1 illustrate areas of convergence but also substantive 
differences in workflow and risk evaluation between markets.  Section 2 outlines six key learning points about 
redundancies and inefficiencies in both markets. Section 3 develops frameworks for relationship management, 
risk evaluation and selective application of face-to-face contact to address these learning points. In Section 4, the 
trading process is broken down into specific modules of activity, with recommendations for best practice in each 
module. Reinsurance firms and broking houses can use this modularisation process as a guide to evaluating and 
changing their current practices.
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Introduction: Evaluating face-to-face and electronic trading
The Lloyd’s of London reinsurance market has grown from a historical tradition of face-to-face interaction 
between reinsurance brokers and underwriters in the assessment and placement of reinsurance risks. Personal 
relationships are seen as crucial in volatile reinsurance markets, where  
trust and personal advocacy are important factors in expert judgement.  
Lloyd’s is, therefore, a market characterised by face-to-face communication, 
which is associated with long-term relationships that enhance expert 
judgement. Modelling applications and electronic trading have met with 
resistance in the past, due to perceptions that models are inaccurate for 
many classes of business, such as casualty, marine and terrorism, while electronic transactions marginalise  
the expert judgement necessary to supplement risk management models.
Recent advances in technology and data communications have enabled other global reinsurance markets 
like Bermuda to compete in a way that does not rely on face-to-face 
interaction. The current Bermudian reinsurance companies were largely 
set up with substantial capital bases and a remit to fill gaps in property 
catastrophe capacity in the wake of US disasters. The prevalence of 
information-rich vendor models for analysing US property catastrophe 
business has increased the reliance on mathematical models to support 
underwriting decisions in this market. Additionally, because Bermuda is an 
isolated market, operating between time zones, trading has more typically 
been conducted through electronic communications. Bermuda is therefore 
a market characterised by electronic communication and associated with 
scientifically-modelled bases of judgement.
While electronic communication is increasingly widespread, strong perceptions remain of reinsurance as  
a relationship-based industry. Face-to-face interaction (face) is a valuable resource in generating the trust that 
supports long-term relationships and repeat transactions over many years. 
It also aids complex negotiation by increasing consensus between parties, 
although this may be undesirable in a free market context of independent 
pricing and decision making. In particular, face interaction produces a 
sense of obligation that can predispose brokers and underwriters to seek 
favours on transactions. Face is also a costly mode of doing business 
because it requires parties to be brought together physically. Electronic 
communication can be more efficient and better suited to independent 
decision-making. However, electronic communication can lack the rich 
conversation, non-verbal expressions and body language necessary to 
transfer knowledge about complex business over repeat negotiations. 
In order to uncover the challenges and potential pitfalls of these changes and their implications for the longer-
term potential of each market, the Insurance Intellectual Capital Initiative (IICI) partnered with the Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC) to commission a one-year ethnographic study with the following objectives:
•  Compare trading practices for face-to-face, expert-based judgement and electronic, scientifically- 
   modelled judgement 
•  Provide a people-centred analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each approach for the various stages of 
   the trading process
•  Consider the implications of each approach for industry evolution
Key Terms
•  Face-to-face communication involves two or more people being present in the same time and space for  
   information exchange, for example in a meeting or informal encounter. 
•  Electronic communication includes a set of technologies, including telephone, email and file-transfer platforms 
   for exchanging information. It is not electronic or online trading.
This report is based on an 
ethnographic study conducted 
in 17 firms over the 2009/10 
reinsurance trading cycle.
Ethnography is a social science 
that involves ‘fly-on-the-wall’ 
observation. It gives detailed 
insights into how work is being 
done, the meanings people 
attribute to the technology and 
other tools that they use, and 
evidence of what practices are and 
are not working in organisations.
The data for this study is unique, 
comprising audio and video 
recording of live trading of 
over 800 decisions and across 
competitors and markets. This 
unprecedented level of access is 
a testament to the reinsurance 
industry’s willingness to examine 
its own practices.
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Section 1: Persistent differences and convergence
1.1 Stereotypical differences
Stereotypical perceptions persist about different trading practices in Lloyd’s and Bermuda. Stereotypes 
accentuate beliefs about a particular group in a generalised and exaggerated way, in the same way that national 
stereotypes expose prevalent beliefs about different cultures. Although they may not be accurate, they contain 
some core truths that facilitate comparison of the essential elements of different groups. This section  
introduces some stereotypical, yet commonly held beliefs about broking and underwriting in the Lloyd’s and 
Bermuda markets.
Lloyd’s stereotypes
Lloyd’s is perceived as a market based on herd instinct. In Lloyd’s there is a strong historical sense of community 
that is reinforced by the centrality of the Lloyd’s building, and expectations that business will be done by brokers 
queuing to see underwriters sitting at boxes in close proximity to each other. This environment facilitates frequent 
and close business and social interaction and rapid exchange of market 
gossip. The closely knit face-to-face market generates strong norms that 
exercise social control on behaviour. Social controls are manifested as 
herd instinct, which is exacerbated by brokers, as they take pencilled lines 
and information on the placement around the trading room, increasing the 
visibility of participants’ actions. Underwriters subconsciously avoid sticking out at the top or the bottom of the 
market, fearing exposure to ridicule if they ‘stick their head above the parapet’ with a price or a line size that is 
strongly at variance with the market. Similarly, they are conscious of the schadenfreude that accompanies losses 
in a market where actions are highly visible. Herd instinct can provide market confidence and stabilise pricing. 
However, its downside is peer pressure, which can favour conservative bets and predispose a portfolio of small, 
low-return lines that are remote from the risk.
The Lloyd’s market offers a bespoke service, as all programmes are treated individually, with multiple personal 
interactions between a broker and underwriter. This bespoke service is particularly valuable on complex 
programmes, or those with scarce information. Face-to-face negotiations, supported by deep relationships 
with and trust in the broker, supplement lack of hard, quantifiable information and enable complex programme 
structures to be tailored to create value for both the cedent and the reinsurer. A bespoke market service can 
support innovation and, indeed, this is a historical feature of the Lloyd’s market which pioneered excess of loss 
reinsurance. However, the downside is that it is often applied indiscriminately; for example, even to renew a small 
expiring line on a well known programme.
A related stereotype of Lloyd’s is that it writes quirky business. The historical core of Lloyd’s was less analysable 
marine business which lent itself well to the bespoke, relationship-based mode of doing business. However, as 
other markets are increasingly good at doing analysable business that does not require as much face interaction, 
they take a larger share of that business. Thus, in an exaggeration of the 
stereotype, Lloyd’s could be left with the quirky business, such as some 
marine, terror and political risks, that is harder to analyse and requires 
more face-time, but is not necessarily high volume or high value business. 
Although a stereotype that does not reflect the actual range of business 
being written in Lloyd’s it is important to be aware of it and guard against 
such perceptions.
Finally, Lloyd’s is a fully-intermediated, broker-led market. London located brokers bring business generated by 
brokers around the world into the Lloyd’s market, ensuring that Lloyd’s underwriters have access to a wide range 
of global business. Strong business relationships are formed through 
frequent interactions that include social events, such as dinner, drinks, 
golfing weekends and race meetings. These relationships advantage the 
broker because of the face-broking that occurs in every stage of the 
trading process. When firm order terms are lower than expected, or when 
a larger line or strong lead is required, brokers can stimulate a sense of 
obligation, either by intimating current or future favours, or more subtly, 
by calling on strong social ties. Simply, it is hard to say no to a person’s 
face, particularly when the relationship is also social.
“If it had a loss, you’d look like  
a real tool if you wrote it”  
(Lloyd’s underwriter)
“All those little dip shit businesses 
... those are the ones that Lloyd’s 
crawls all over itself to write; at 
10%, there’s no profit margin in it” 
(Bermudian underwriter)
“We’ll see you at Ascot; you and 
the wife. You haven’t been keeping 
up with your social obligations 
enough (laughing), so you should 
really do Ascot AND Wimbledon 
this year”  
(Lloyd’s Broker to Lloyd’s 
Underwriter)
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Bermuda stereotypes
The Bermudian market is characterised by a different set of stereotypes. 
In contrast to the herd instinct that characterises Lloyd’s, the dominant 
mentality in Bermuda is to stand out at the top by writing large profitable 
lines. With large capital bases, no market restrictions on line size, and 
a focus on profitable and more analysable US property catastrophe 
business, many Bermudian companies favour writing large lines and, if 
possible, dominating those programmes where there is good information 
to appraise risks. This is perceived as a rational competitive choice; if a company sees a programme it believes it 
can understand and price profitably for the degree of risk, it makes competitive sense to take as large a share as 
the client allows.
The origin of Bermudian property reinsurance in information-rich US property catastrophe business, has led to  
a perception that Bermudians are model-driven. While extreme and rare events, such as earthquakes, are hard to 
model accurately, vendor models provide useful guidelines, because they have high quality information to support 
risk evaluation, including zipcode data on the location of risks and a 
measurement of the probable occurrence of claims. Bermudians do ‘load’ 
vendor models to account for the soft or more judgemental elements of a 
risk. However, they write more quantifiable risks, leading to a stereotypical, 
albeit inaccurate, view that they lack experience or judgement, and 
excessively rely on models to price risks. 
A third stereotype of Bermudian reinsurers is that they struggle to diversify. They write ‘vanilla’ mono line 
property catastrophe business, because other types of business, such as international property, aviation, marine 
and energy do not compare favourably to big lines on US catastrophe programmes in terms of either technical 
evaluation or profit margin. This is seen as a weakness for Bermudian companies because a diversified portfolio 
spreads risk and is necessary to improve standing with rating agencies. 
Finally, Bermuda is more of an underwriter-led market in which reinsurers 
typically initiate contact with brokers. Therefore, no strong Bermuda 
stereotype has formed with regards to broking practices. Rather, 
Bermudian reinsurers often have ‘location paranoia’, fearing that they  
will miss business because they are geographically remote. They therefore 
actively court brokers and clients, for example through sailing, deep-sea 
fishing and diving trips, to encourage them to bring interesting pieces  
of business. However, these fears may be associated with being relatively new in the global market rather than 
a feature of location. Once Bermudians establish a presence on programmes, there is no reason to assume that 
their location will mean they are written out of business where capacity is needed.
1.2 Convergence: Overlooked similarities
The above stereotypes reflect persistent beliefs that do not always keep pace 
with reality. There is much more similarity in the two markets than these 
stereotypes convey, particularly in the use of a full range of face, phone and 
email communication and in the reliance on technical models to support risk 
analysis and pricing. However, this convergence is occurring naturally, rather 
than as part of a strategic effort to change practices. Hence, the firms 
are not necessarily aware of this gradual evolution in industry practices.
Lloyd’s: Thinking outside the box
The box remains the dominant place for interacting, but it is no longer the dominant place for decision-making. 
Rather, there is considerable evidence of ‘thinking outside the box’:
•  The box is a place for ratifying a decision that has largely been made through analysis and thinking in the office. 
•  Decisions are being deferred from the box to take into account the increasing technicality of decision-making,  
   in which all classes of business are subject to at least some quantitative analysis. 
•  A greater mix of communication media is being used, as Lloyd’s underwriters and brokers phone and email 
   each other and brokers go directly to reinsurers’ offices to work through programmes, often to make use of time 
   outside box hours. 
These changes are covert. Box visits continue to be regarded as the norm despite considerable frustration with 
their inefficiencies. For example, while brokers often feel that queuing is a waste of time, they also believe that 
many underwriters expect this show of commitment. As strong social norms sustain the myth that the box is 
central to decision making, it is imperative that brokers and underwriters clarify how they wish to communicate 
“We don’t write 5% on every deal 
that comes across the desk. If we 
think we really understand the 
risk in a particular deal, we’ll take 
as much of it as we possibly can” 
(Bermudian underwriter)
“The teenage scribblers on the rock;  
Bermudians just basically regurgitate 
what comes out of a computer” 
(Lloyd’s underwriter)
“Any opportunity we get to do 
business we jump on; then we might  
take them sailing. If you’re friendly 
with the broker your relationship 
with the client is better” 
(Bermudian Underwriter)
Lloyd’s versus Bermuda is not a 
robust distinction. Stereotypes 
are exaggerated and overlook 
similarities between the markets.
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on a programme. Wider acknowledgment of these naturally occurring changes would alleviate the pressure to 
conform to social norms of appearing at the box without consideration of the added value to be gained from  
that interaction.
Bermudians in contact
The Bermudian market also shows convergence in forms of communication, as underwriters and brokers actively 
stimulate interaction for the following reasons:
•  Underwriters regularly phone their brokers to discuss the details of a programme when they need help to 
   understand complex pieces of business.
•  Many Lloyd’s trained underwriters and brokers working in the Bermudian market transfer their Lloyd’s contacts, 
   enabling them to draw on well known social networks.
•  A growing number of brokers work on location in a wholesale broking role in Bermuda, interacting face-to-face 
   with underwriters in their offices to provide information on complex programmes and new classes of business. 
•  Bermudian reinsurers are actively diversifying into the classes of business being written in Lloyd’s, such as 
   marine and aviation. They interact frequently with brokers through phone and email, placing small lines as an 
   ‘R&D’ approach to learning about this business. 
In Bermuda, three factors mitigate the impact of reduced opportunities for face-to-face interaction. First, as 
Bermudians have become increasingly practiced at doing business by phone and email, their familiarity reduces 
the extent to which it is less effective than face. Second, as many Bermudian underwriters already personally 
know their brokers around the world from site visits and social occasions, they have a social network that they 
can draw on effectively by phone and email to transact business. Third, Bermudian reinsurers are often working 
on well-known renewal business on which email and phone provide sufficiently rich communication to substitute 
for face interaction.
Evidence of Convergence
Both markets: 
•  Use all forms of communication from email to phone to face; 
•  Are strongly focused on technical analysis of risk; 
•  Write across the range of classes of business
1.3 Workflow differences
Despite evidence of convergence there are robust differences in workflow in the Lloyd’s and Bermuda 
marketplaces. Much of this variation arises because of differences in broker intermediation. Lloyd’s has a two-
filter intermediation process in which London ‘wholesale’ brokers bring global business into the Lloyd’s market. 
The ‘retail broker’ who has produced the business in its country of origin uses the Lloyd’s broker to place the 
business in Lloyd’s.  Bermuda, by contrast, has a one-filter intermediation process, where reinsurers deal directly 
with the retail broker in the country of origin, 
which necessitates phone or email contact. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, these differences are 
associated with variation in the extent and 
intensity of direct interaction during the four 
phases of the trading process.
As shown in Figure 1, both markets engage  
equally in face-to-face interaction during  
the client meetings that are part of the pre-
submission phase. These pre-submission 
activities take the following forms. First, there 
are meetings between brokers, clients and 
reinsurers at industry conferences, such as  
the Reinsurance Rendezvous in Monte Carlo, 
and follow up conferences in Baden-Baden  
and PCI in the USA. These interactions are 
always face-to-face, although their value has  
to be questioned given the brevity of meetings, 
which can be as short as 25 minutes. Both markets also see a continuous 
stream of clients on roadshows, as London and Bermuda are popular 
places for a visit, bringing the possibility of some golf, deep-sea fishing 
or opera, as well as business. Additionally, there is high-profile corporate 
entertainment, such as trips to ski resorts and islands, which, while 
“We did a sailing event on the 
south coast of the UK just because 
one of our clients liked sailing”. 
(Bermudian Underwriter)
Figure 1: Comparison of direct interaction patterns in Lloyd’s 
and Bermuda
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Phase
Submission
Formal start of trading process, 
through submission of information 
from broker to underwriter.
Quoting
Reinsurers analyse programmes 
and submit prices to brokers, which 
generates a range of potential 
prices for a programme.
Authorisation
Final decision involves: 
•  Brokers submit prices, known as 
   Firm Order Terms (FOTs) to  
   underwriters;
•  Underwriters offer the size of line 
   they wish to have on different 
   layers of the program, termed 
   writing a line.
Brokers allocate underwriters all 
or part of the line offered, termed 
signing a line.
Made at the box with the wholesale 
broker bringing a paper copy of the 
information pack to the meeting.
•  Brokers value the opportunity to 
   influence underwriter’s 
   impression of the programme. 
•  Underwriters value the focus 
   on key aspects of the programme 
   while gathering other potentially 
   valuable market gossip. 
Underwriter advises analysts, who 
are usually located in the same 
office, to take specific factors  
into account.
Multiple broker visits at the box to 
supply additional information about 
the risk. 
Process can add value where 
deals are complex and require 
negotiation to arrive at a structure 
that meets the client’s need and  
a price that is acceptable in  
the market.
Underwriters await broker visit at 
box to submit quote. 
Face interaction as the broker brings 
FOT to the box on a sheet of paper. 
•  Brokers value face as they can 
   persuade potentially reluctant 
   underwriters to support less 
   favourable programmes. 
•  Underwriters establish whether 
   there is flexibility in pricing 
   and the extent of capacity in 
   the market, in order to judge their 
   commitment to a line and layer.
Lines are pencilled at the box, 
meaning that underwriters put 
a signature against the line they 
will write which binds them to the 
offer that will appear on the formal 
authorisation document. 
•  Underwriters can see the 
   extent to which other reinsurers 
   have supported a programme 
   so reinforcing their own 
   market conformity.
Done by email as submissions come 
directly from retail brokers.
Typically a submission is forwarded 
straight to the analyst without 
looking at it or talking with  
the broker. 
The underwriter takes a first proper 
look at the risk when the modelling 
comes back from the analyst, who 
is usually located in a different 
country to the underwriters.
Underwriters contact the broker  
by phone or email if they have 
specific queries about the nature  
of the programme. 
Phone contact is used particularly 
in cases where the programme 
structure is complicated; additional  
information is required to understand 
the risk; or to gauge the ballpark in 
which to position the quote.
Underwriters submit quote by email.
Contact with the broker may be 
by email if it is simply a matter 
of writing a line, but may involve 
phone contact, depending on the 
extent of variation between the 
quoting price and the FOT.
The slip is then emailed, as the 
logical end to a piece of business, 
rather than an opportunity for 
further direct interaction and, 
potentially, extraction of favours  
or influence on either side.
Broker emails signed lines. 
Lloyd’s Bermuda
less frequent, occur for senior executives and their spouses in both markets. While these relationship building 
activities are undoubtedly fun, they need to be systematically applied to achieve specific value-adding objectives, 
which is the focus of Section 3.2. 
Following pre-submission, the two markets vary significantly in the extent of direct interaction during the 
submission, quoting, and authorisation phases of the trading process. These differences are explained in Table 1.
Table 1: Variation in phases of the workflow between the two markets
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Differences in direct interaction during the workflow
Submission 
•  Lloyd’s: High direct interaction, predominantly face-to-face
•  Bermuda: Low direct interaction, predominantly email
Quoting
•  Lloyd’s: High direct interaction, predominantly face-to-face
•  Bermuda: Moderate direct interaction, predominantly phone
Authorisation
•  Lloyd’s: High direct interaction, predominantly face-to-face for writing and signing lines
•  Bermuda: Moderate direct interaction, with some phone for writing lines, shifting to low interaction using email 
   for signing lines
1.4 Does difference make a difference? Contextual and analytic ‘gut feel’
Differences in workflow do not usually generate differences in price, except on private deals, because reinsurance 
is largely a subscription market. However, they do generate differences in the initial appraisal of a programme 
because of difference in the face-based or electronic submission process. First impressions of a risk matter for  
its subsequent evaluation.
In Lloyd’s, the initial ‘gut feel’ or intuitive impression comes from the face-to-face submission during which the 
broker explains the firm-specific, regional or historical context in which this programme and cedent are situated 
and which should be considered in subsequent analysis. This first impression informs the modelling of the risk, 
as Lloyd’s underwriters and analysts are co-located. Underwriters are able to discuss with analysts the ‘soft’ 
factors in the submission that need to be accounted for in modelling. We label this initial appraisal contextual 
judgement, because it places the risk in its own particular relationship, 
programme and market context, including those soft factors that may 
not be incorporated in models. The Lloyd’s market is good at evaluating 
programmes in context. This is why Lloyd’s is able to make judgements on 
unusual or complex programmes, even those with lower margins or hard-
to-model qualities.
By contrast, in Bermuda submissions come in by email and are forwarded straight to the analyst, who is often 
in another country rather than co-located with the underwriter. Underwriters form their initial ‘gut feel’ when 
they look at the modelled results. If the analysis is not favourable, the underwriter calls the broker for more 
information and then contacts the analyst to remodel in light of that information. While Bermudian underwriters 
appreciate soft factors, they ‘need a number’ to suit their technical approach to underwriting. We label  
this analytic assessment. It explains why Bermudian underwriters are 
focused on information-rich risks that they can analyse,  why they  
are willing to place large ‘bets’ on those risks that they have analysed,  
and why they have traditionally struggled to write information-scarce, 
hard-to-quantify risks.
Implications of differences in initial appraisal of risk
Risk appraisal varies by whether the first impression is formed:
•  Prior to analysis, emphasizing contextual judgement; or 
•  After analysis, emphasizing analytic assessment. 
The emphasis on contextual or analytic judgement should vary with the specific properties of any particular risk, 
not with the way information is initially received.
Section 2: No one best way 
2.1 Strategic implications of the different locations
Section 1 indicates that there is no one best way. There are advantages and disadvantages to doing business in 
either Lloyd’s or Bermuda. However, the two cases indicate strategic aspects of each market that are significant 
for industry evolution. Essentially, Lloyd’s is ‘here to stay’. The physical aspects of a market in which different 
players are co-located and interact within a central trading hub, such as the Lloyd’s building, mean that this 
marketplace is tied to its geographic location. It is attractive to market participants because of the ease of access 
to other participants in that location. Furthermore, the central hub adds value for business that requires face-to-
face trading, particularly at the point of decision-making. 
“The art is very important. It is 
the nose; you can tell if something 
doesn’t look right” 
(Lloyd’s underwriter)
“We want data on everything.  
No exposure data – no deal” 
(Bermudian underwriter)
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However, much business can be transacted through selective use of face at prior stages in the process, for 
example in pre-submission meetings. Hence, Bermuda is a useful example of the ‘transportable’ nature of 
reinsurance markets; it is possible to trade by phone and email from anywhere and to ‘pack up and leave’  
if conditions become unfavourable. While this may be a threat to Bermuda as a specific financial marketplace,  
it is an opportunity to the reinsurance industry more widely, because it provides opportunities for ‘institutional 
arbitrage’ shifting to locations where a favourable combination of labour, regulation and taxation enable efficient 
or cost-effective business.
2.2 Key learning points about inefficiencies and redundancies 
Neither the Lloyd’s nor the Bermuda workflow and initial basis for judgement are ideal. Rather, the two markets 
reveal six main redundancies and inefficiencies that provide key learning points for the wider reinsurance market. 
Appraise client meetings: Both markets have high face interaction for client meetings. However, the purpose 
of client meetings and the value that different types of face add is not clear. Rather, various interactions from 
conference meetings to roadshows to corporate entertainment are used indiscriminately. Face strengthens 
business relationships by providing better client information, particularly in regions or classes of business where 
information is less available. Face also deepens existing relationships and strengthens competitive advantage 
on programmes where information is widely available. In order to generate more value, the different purposes 
of client meetings should be defined and used to distinguish the most appropriate type of face-to-face meeting. 
Methods for maximising value from client meetings are proposed in Section 3.2.
Develop focussed broker intermediation: Brokers add value by intermediating between cedents and reinsurers. 
However, the role of different types of broker intermediation in creating value for cedent-reinsurer 
relationships lacks focus. Underwriters want high quality cedent information to support risk evaluation. Brokers 
who have close relationships with their clients can provide high-quality information packaged in a user-friendly 
way. Thus, underwriters that deal directly with the retail broker who produced the cedent may be at an advantage. 
Wholesale brokers add value through their deep understanding of particular reinsurers’ appetites for business 
which can be strengthened to better cross-sell and establish more exclusive business-to-business broker-reinsurer 
relationships. Frameworks for distinguishing the purpose of different broker relationships and increasing their 
value in the intermediation process are presented in Section 3.2.
Make broker-underwriter contact on a ‘need-to-know’ basis: In Lloyd’s there is repeat face interaction at all 
stages of the process. This is due to both habit and filtering of information in a wholesale broking market, where 
wholesale brokers revert to the retail broker to gather specific information. By contrast, Bermudian underwriters 
tend to have contact with retail brokers on a ‘need-to-know’ basis, going directly to the source of information 
when they have a specific query. We advocate direct contact between either retail or wholesale brokers and 
underwriters for specific purposes, rather than indiscriminate application of face-to-face interaction out of habit. 
In particular, as face is a costly resource, face-to-face interaction should be used where it adds value and 
substituted with email or phone where these are equally valuable, which is presented in Section 3.4. 
Identify information deficits: Face-to-face interaction adds value when there is need for richer information to 
evaluate a risk. For complex programmes and those that lack quality information, phone and email are less 
effective modes of communication. First, missing the initial verbal broke that aids contextual judgement often 
leads to re-analysis when further information is gathered. Second, it is difficult to work through the information 
that supports complex risks on the phone; it is hard to be on the same page or, indeed, the same cell of a 
spreadsheet when working by phone. Hence, face interaction should be selectively applied to add value in the 
quoting phase for complex and information scarce risks (see Section 3.3). 
Avoid duplication: Duplication of paper and electronic information involves duplication of effort and obstructs 
systematic and transparent logging of risks. A face-based system of interaction, such as at Lloyd’s, predisposes 
duplication because a paper copy is always brought to the box. That paper copy is typically scanned as a record of 
the transaction, in addition to emailed copies, so duplicating both information and effort. By contrast, electronic 
submission predisposes an electronic process, which is supported by the tailor-made start up systems in some 
Bermudian companies. However, even in Bermuda, some companies also routinely print and store paper copies 
of their files. Thus, both markets show duplication of information and systems that are partially paper-based and 
partially electronic. 
Be aware of historic rituals: Signing the slip is an elaborate and time-consuming face-based Lloyd’s ritual. It 
is, quite literally, the ‘underwriter’s pen’, which symbolises the quality of underwriting at Lloyd’s. In this ritual, the 
broker presents the slip for each layer to the underwriter, who stamps it, records the programme numbers and 
lines by hand, and then signs the slip, typically using a specifically designated and valuable pen. The slip is then 
passed to the underwriter’s assistant, who scans it and returns it to the broker. This ritual takes up to 20 minutes 
to complete. By contrast, in Bermuda one person can process a batch of slips across a number of risks in a short 
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period of work. Signing the slip is symbolic, with no evidence that the actual quality of underwriting is affected 
by electronic or face-to-face slip processing. It is thus important to evaluate the ongoing purpose or efficiency of 
some rituals.
Six key learning points to address inefficiencies and redundancies 
•  Distinguish the purpose of client meetings
•  Develop focussed retail and wholesale broker intermediation
•  Establish face-to-face contact on a ‘need-to-know’ basis
•  Identify those information deficits under which face adds value
•  Avoid duplication of paper and electronic information
•  Identify and minimise ritualistic use of face, such as signing the slip
Section 3: Addressing inefficiencies and redundancies
3.1 Three key dimensions of the trading process
In order to address the inefficiencies and redundancies identified above, it is necessary to understand three key 
dimensions on which trading hinges: relationship value, information quality, and programme complexity. 
Relationship value
In order to maximise value from relationships, it is necessary to measure 
the relative value of any particular relationship. Reinsurers should use 
pre-submission meetings to score and rank clients on their value; that is, 
their importance for the underwriter’s book and the portfolio of the firm. 
In this scoring exercise, ‘‘value’ should be interpreted broadly to include 
current value, but also potential value based on business development 
plans. It should consider possible changes in the cedent’s level of 
reinsurance purchasing, the cross-selling potential across different classes of risk, and its level of correlation 
within the reinsurer’s portfolio. Understanding relationship value ensures that those relations which generate the 
most solid returns to a firm receive the highest levels of relationship management, including entertainment such 
as sailing, golf, skiing and dinner. At the same time it guards against over-investing in face-to-face interaction and 
other costly mechanisms of relationship management where opportunities for pay-off are limited.
Information quality 
Information quality is the key dimension on which both pre-submission 
relationship management and post-submission risk appraisal and 
interaction hinge. High quality information accurately specifies the 
value of insured assets, be it a single aircraft or a cluster of properties 
in a designated area. Granularity reflects the level of detail with which 
aggregate values are covered, for instance whether property values are 
aggregated by district or postcode, helping to improve the accuracy of 
estimates about the magnitude of a potential loss. High quality data is  
also presented in a standardised, easily analysable form. 
Verifiability measures the extent to which cedent-provided data can be cross-checked against information from 
independent sources, such as ratings agencies or subscription databases such as Perils. High quality information 
may be gathered in two ways. First, information about the cedent’s governance, portfolio and underwriting 
practices can be gained through pre-submission meetings; so called ‘underwriting the underwriter’. Second, 
quantitative and ‘soft’ information about the risk may be gathered from the submission documents and any 
supplementary broker interaction.
Programme complexity
The relative complexity of a programme refers to the structure of a reinsurance product, such as the number 
of layers being bought to provide a horizontal or vertical cover. Programmes with a simple structure clearly 
define inclusions and exclusions, provide more transparency and are, thus, more easily analysable. By contrast, 
programmes that conflate multiple perils within layers or those with complex wrap-around structures obscure 
the specific elements being reinsured and complicate underwriter analysis. Therefore, more complex structures 
are likely to necessitate more broker-underwriter interaction during submission and risk appraisal. 
“Relationships to make business 
more sticky are probably more 
important than the knowledge of 
the underlying risk. I think you can 
get that without a relationship”. 
(Bermudian Underwriter)
“It’s understand the company, 
what they do and how they do it,  
how they make decisions, get 
inside how they underwrite, how 
they select risks, how they adjust 
claims, what risks they’re taking on.”  
(Lloyd’s Underwriter)
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These three dimensions are the foundation for our following proposals to improve pre-submission relationship 
management (Section 3.2), post-submission risk appraisal (Section 3.3), and the efficient use of electronic and 
face-based communication (Section 3.4). Critically, as shown in Figure 2, information quality is the hinge upon 
which to evaluate:  
 
•  How best to add value in client relationships
•  What blend of analytic and contextual judgement is best for appraising different risks
•  When it is most effective to use face-to-face, phone or email interaction 
Figure 2: Key dimensions for managing the pre and post-submission process
3.2 Pre-submission relationship management 
Reinsurance is not characterised by spot transactions between parties who never meet again. Therefore, 
relationships between cedents, underwriters, and brokers have always been at the heart of the industry. 
Traditionally, these relationships were built on personal social ties and trust. Increasingly, however, these are 
being superseded by business-to-business relationships. At the same time, personal goodwill trust (“he’s a nice 
guy; we’ve played golf together”) is being superseded by trust in the information cedents provide or the practices 
they employ (“they’re good underwriters”). Good relationships produce 
information and trust that helps partners to transact business in the face 
of uncertainty. Yet, despite the positive effects that good relationships 
can achieve, there is little clarity about what any particular relationship 
is meant to achieve. Relationship management is thus poorly customised. 
Choosing the right form of engagement is difficult when the purpose of a 
relationship is unclear. Therefore, reinsurers, cedents and brokers should 
conduct a relationship appraisal to determine the dominant purpose of 
a relationship.
Relationship appraisal
Relationship appraisal is a scoring exercise to establish the dominant purpose of a relationship. 
It answers questions of:
•  Which business partners do we want relationships with?
•  What is the main purpose of a relationship?
•  How should the relationship be managed?
Choosing who to ski, drink or dine 
with, who to visit, and who to see 
at conferences is best determined 
by the purpose of the business 
relationship, rather than the 
conviviality of the individual
11
Relationships in reinsurance serve two main purposes: First, relationships help address information deficits, 
because underwriters need confidence that they understand what they are reinsuring to make decisions. This 
confidence is either based on high quality data about risks or on compelling information that instils trust in the 
cedent’s underwriting practices. Second, relationships help gain and maintain access to preferred, valuable 
business partners. Generally, transaction parties invest more time in nurturing relationships with high-value 
business partners because they have greater potential for pay off.
These objectives – counteracting information deficits and securing access to valuable partners – should dictate 
how a relationship is managed. As their balance can shift from year to year it is essential to re-evaluate 
relationships at the beginning of each renewal season. To capture the dominant relationship purpose, business 
partners can be scored on the two dimensions: information quality and relationship value. By combining the 
resultant scores, market participants are able to develop a relationship portfolio, in which they can match the 
purpose of a relationship with the most suitable type of pre-submission meeting.
Managing the relationship portfolio
Based on the relationship appraisal exercise, reinsurers can rank cedents on a numeric scorecard and position 
them in the relationship portfolio matrix shown in Figure 3. Brokers can do the same for their clients’ reinsurer 
panel, as discussed later. The quadrants distinguish four distinct, idealised types of relationship with associated 
typical forms of interaction that fall into two broad categories: high engagement strategies for high value clients 
and low engagement relationships for low value clients. 
Figure 3: The relationship portfolio matrix
•  A watching relationship is appropriate for cedents whose development an underwriter wants to ‘watch from
   a distance’. The client’s low value makes it uneconomical to invest in a closer relationship that could overcome 
   informational deficits. Meeting at one of the annual reinsurance conferences is sufficient to stay appraised of 
   the cedent’s business development without committing serious resources. Alternatively, brokers could manage 
   watching relationships for reinsurers.
•  The holding relationship is typically a case of keeping a small but well managed client on the books and
   ensuring the relationship is maintained to profit from any change in growth or potential value. Underwriters 
   should be willing to commit some time to these clients, for example seeing them on a pre-renewal roadshow. 
   Deeper personal engagement is inefficient because there are no information deficits to be addressed through 
   extensive face-to-face interaction and client value does not warrant such investment.
•  The purpose of a probing relationship is to develop sufficient confidence in a cedents’ underwriting ability
   to counteract the lack of publicly available information. This type of relationship is best managed by visiting 
   client premises and probing their work practices; so-called ‘kicking the tyres’. Seeing the risks and how they 
   are managed helps reinsurers to validate information they find in submission packs. The costly investment of 
   conducting client visits in person is warranted by the value of the client. 
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•  The objective of a grooming relationship is to ‘get more of what everybody wants’; analysable, high-value
   business. All players in the market can appraise the attractiveness of these clients, leading to oversubscription 
   and heavy signings. Therefore, underwriters should use high engagement strategies to ‘groom’ clients. The aim 
   of the relationship is to protect participation on the programme, expand line size, extend the relationship to 
   other programmes, or even to participate in private deals. Grooming relationships create barriers to entry for 
   other reinsurers. Corporate entertainment is thus an important tactic; high-quality social events such as skiing 
   and sailing signal willingness to invest in a relationship.
Focused retail and wholesale broker intermediation
Brokers can add value to cedent-reinsurer relationships by playing one of two roles. Understanding these roles 
can help broking houses provide focused intermediation. 
•  Brokers add value by acting as information producers. Here, the retail broker’s deep knowledge of the cedent
   is critical in addressing information deficits. However, often information is not well-packaged or usable, which 
   frustrates reinsurers and undermines rather than enhances their confidence to write the business. 
•  Brokers act as relationship mediators, ensuring that clients have a suitable spread of reinsurers on their books,
   and that reinsurers gain access to all relevant business in the most efficient way. Good relationships are those 
   in which the broker has deep knowledge of the reinsurer’s book of business and appetite for growth in particular 
   areas. A wholesale broker may be in a better position to understand and serve the reinsurer’s interests in seeing 
   an appropriate range of business.
While both broking roles are important, their extent and nature varies according to the type of relationship they 
mediate. It is imperative for brokers to understand the type of relationship that will add value between clients and 
the different reinsurers on their panel. Brokers should rank different reinsurers according to their significance 
on their client’s programme and score their clients according to the information concerns that they expect from 
reinsurers. They can then identify the required relationship type and support appropriate engagement, using the 
categories in the relationship portfolio matrix (Figure 3)
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Holding relationship
•  Brokers act as relationship mediators. Clients benefit 
   from brokers’ ability to attract relevant reinsurers 
   to their roadshow, based on their knowledge of 
   reinsurers’ risk appetite.
•  Reinsurers will give time where brokers use focused 
   intermediation to add value; they trust a broker to 
   show them not all business, but all relevant business.
Watching relationship
•  Brokers act as information producers, by packaging 
   information in usable ways; including pushing the 
   client for improved information that meets 
   underwriter expectations. 
•  Face-time with reinsurers should be appropriate to 
   client value. Brokers can interact with these clients 
   and mediate deals until such time as information 
   quality and value warrant a conference meeting  
   with reinsurers. 
Grooming relationship
•  Brokers act as relationship mediators by ensuring 
   that high-value cedents and reinsurers with robust 
   capacity have sufficient high quality and exclusive 
   social time to build strong relationships. 
•  Brokers must manage the signing process so that 
   relationship partners are rewarded for their loyalty 
   and clients get the desired spread of supporters.
Probing relationship
•  Brokers act as information producers to ensure that 
   contextual factors are communicated in ways that 
   inform underwriters’ judgement. 
•  Brokers must maximise the value of client visits 
   by preparing the client to make relevant practices
   transparent and accessible. A retail broker’s 
   deep client knowledge guides attention to those 
   underwriting practices that instil confidence in  
  the client. 
Recommendations for developing a portfolio approach to relationships
Evaluate clients on two dimensions: information quality; and current and potential value
Use client evaluations to determine into which of four ideal types a relationship belongs and allocate face-to-face 
engagement time accordingly
•  Watching: Conference meetings
•  Holding: Roadshows
•  Probing: Client visits
•  Grooming: Corporate entertainment
Brokers enhance the value of relationships by acting as:
•  Information producers for reinsurers; 
•  Relationship mediators to bring together clients and reinsurers in ways that meet their informational and 
   competitive objectives
3.3 Appraising risks
Risk appraisal is a complex process. It depends on the likely occurrence of an event, such as a natural peril that, 
as an extreme and rare event, is hard to model, and also on variables that are determined by the cedent’s book 
of business and its projected change. Risk appraisal is not only complex, but also the central activity in the 
reinsurance trading process. It builds on the processing of submission information, and provides the basis for 
underwriters’ quoting prices as well as the ultimate authorisation of specific line sizes and layers. As explained 
in Section 1.4, which compared the initial impressions of a risk arising from different workflows, we identified two 
dominant approaches to evaluating risk: 
•  Analytical assessment 
•  Contextual judgement 
Analytical assessment of a risk
Analytical assessment of a risk rests on a quantitative analysis of the factors that constitute a specific risk,  
such as total insured values, territorial scope, nature of cover sought and its relative measurability in terms of  
a potential loss. The dominant instruments for analytically assessing a risk are vendor models and in-house tools. 
In line with tightened regulation and underwriting guidelines, mathematically-derived vendor models, such 
as RMS, AIR and EQECAT, have a strong impact upon risk appraisal. They 
produce loss estimates with regards to specific perils and help to establish 
a ‘technical’ price for a defined risk relative to similar other risks. While 
vendor models support technical evaluation, their results should be 
interpreted cautiously. They strongly depend on the accuracy and detail 
of the underlying data, which lacks quality in many territories. Most firms 
thus also use in-house tools as a supplement to or substitute for vendor 
models. These are typically benchmarking tools that enable historical 
year-on-year analysis, comparison of risks within and across regions, and 
appraisal of their return on equity by programme and by layer, ideally in 
relation to some overarching firm-level expectations of profitability.
Shortcomings of analytical assessment
Rigorous analytical assessment of a risk is only possible when three key weaknesses are considered: i) skewed 
outputs and model error; ii) data availability; and iii) data accuracy. Vendor models and in-house tools enable 
numerical comparisons that are important for transparent technical risk pricing. However, their outputs need 
a well-informed interpretation that considers a model’s underlying variables, the weightings that skew its 
results, and data quality. Indeed, all firms have ways of supplementing vendor models with their own analytic 
interpretations, which can be quantified. With the accuracy of models in question, outputs also depend on the 
availability and quality of other information for performing analysis. 
Contextual judgement of risk
Contextual judgement involves evaluating a risk in its own particular relationship context, taking into account 
soft factors that give confidence beyond the risk’s technical analysis. Contextual judgement of a risk is crucial to 
counteract information deficits. There are three dominant approaches: i) market intelligence; ii) cedent analysis; 
and iii) capacity check. 
Market intelligence is a soft factor in which risk appraisal is influenced by people’s perceptions of trends, such as 
whether it is a soft or hard market, and market rumours, for example about significant losses, or programmes 
where payouts are anticipated. Market intelligence is also shaped by supply and demand or the market capacity 
for a specific reinsurance product. 
Cedent analysis is another contextual factor, which can be somewhat quantifiable. For example, a strengths and 
weaknesses analysis can evaluate a cedent’s ratings, market share, and aspects of governance and financial 
strength. It is also important to consider the longevity of the relationship, in terms of the balance of incoming 
and outgoing payments over several years. These factors should be considered in relation to the value of the 
specific cedent’s business within the overall firm portfolio (see Section 3.2). 
“I stress test with our model 
which takes RMS and lets me add 
different factors to load aspects 
of it. I am just checking to see 
whether certain types of events 
would push the exposure up  
the layers, or what impact they 
would have” 
(Bermudian Underwriter)
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Finally, a capacity check ensures that the portfolio is balanced through a range of non-correlating business. The 
attractiveness of any risk varies according to the extent to which a firm has capacity in any particular region or 
class of business.
Shortcomings of contextual judgement
While contextual judgement criteria give confidence beyond the risk’s 
technical analysis, there are two major weaknesses: i) lack of hard 
information to base a justification on, resulting in; ii) absence of a 
consistent approach to appraising risks. While some of this judgement 
will always be subjective, some contextual factors can be ‘measured’, so 
that there is a trail of evidence for trading decisions. These rationales for 
writing a risk should be logged in an in-house information system. Storing 
this information provides a basis to transfer skills and valuable contextual 
knowledge within a team, rather than residing within ‘the head’ of an 
individual underwriter who ‘knows’ the cedent or the risk. 
Integrating approaches to appraising risk
Both analytic assessment and contextual judgement are necessary to comprehensively appraise risks. In order to 
address the weakness of over-reliance on one or the other, we suggest an integrative approach to appraising risk.
Analytic assessment is a constant. It must be performed in order to demonstrate the transparency of risk-taking 
from a regulatory perspective. It also provides an important technical basis for benchmarking and evaluating risks 
during the quoting and authorisation phases of the trading process. While vendor models are widely perceived 
to be inaccurate and no firm uses them without internal methods to 
accommodate soft factors, they are still useful as benchmarks to support 
analytic judgement. Even where vendor models are not available or lack 
sufficient information, some internal method of analysis is performed. In 
addition to modelling, analytic assessment is supported by comparative 
analysis to benchmark from year-to-year and from risk-to-risk within 
particular regions. 
Contextual judgement of a risk attaches more weight to a range of soft factors, such as wider market effects and 
cedent analysis. It is particularly likely to be influenced by interactions with the cedent, in order to understand 
the quality of the data and the relative value of that cedent within the firm portfolio (see Section 3.2). It is also 
influenced by the social network effects of appraising the market through interaction with peers (market trends, 
market capacity and market rumours). Contextual judgement provides reasoning for prices and justification for 
writing or declining risks at a particular price threshold. Much of this contextual judgement can be captured in 
standardised indicators that may even be quantified for use with in-house models or to weight the output of 
vendor models. While some contextual judgement is valuable for most risks, it is essential to adequately appraise 
those risks that are complex or lacking information.
Integrating analytic assessment and contextual judgement addresses the shortcomings of either approach if 
used in isolation. Provided that information is available, analytic assessment of a risk offers technical pricing 
and benchmarks on the basis of scenarios and other comparative analyses. In the case of information deficits, 
contextual judgement of the cedent offers another angle for assessing risks. It complements and may even 
substitute for analytic assessment. Such analysis enables differentiation of risks that may look very similar on the 
basis of modelled results but differ hugely in their underlying organisational processes, such as claims handling. 
Combining analytic assessment and contextual judgement overcomes skewed results from vendor models and 
in-house tools focused on retrospective loss data, while also ensuring a technical basis for evaluating risks. It 
provides a framework to assess cedents and their risks on a stand-alone basis and/or to compare risks across 
classes of business and territories.
Both analytic assessment and contextual judgement need to be integrated systematically for a comprehensive 
appraisal of risks.
Integrating analytical and contextual judgement highlights the need for skills that go beyond the use of 
spreadsheets and mathematically derived models. The development and transfer of skills and knowledge in 
using both forms of evaluation is essential to the trading process. Systematic integration of approaches enables 
reinsurers to diversify into classes of business and territories that do not have good quality vendor models but 
require creative solutions to complex risks. 
“There is quite a lot of subjective 
judgment that we may be using 
but it’s not something that I would 
do on my own.  I’d have a chat with 
[my colleague]; get him to just 
double-check that he thinks it’s a 
sensible decision or even with our 
Chief Underwriting Officer if it’s 
one of our major programmes” 
(Lloyd’s Underwriter)
“We are model-driven in a way, 
but we don’t take them as gospel. 
We use them as appropriate” 
(Bermudian Underwriter)
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Classifying risks and interaction according to analytic properties 
The risk evaluation matrix, Figure 4, provides a way to classify risks according to their information quality and 
the relative complexity of the programme structure, and to allocate email, phone or face interaction accordingly 
to help understand the risk. As indicated by the size of the ‘bubbles’, the lower the information quality, the more 
contextual judgement is required to supplement analytic assessment. Similarly, the more complex a programme 
structure, the more contextual judgement will be required to supplement analytic assessment, even in the 
presence of high-quality information. Taken together, these two dimensions indicate the extent to which risk 
appraisal can be standardized or needs to be tailored. 
Generally, when a programme structure is simple, it can be transacted by email whereas when it is complex,  
it requires more direct information, such as phone or face to discuss the specifics of the programme structure. 
However, the extent of interaction is mitigated by information quality, as more direct interaction is required to 
supplement information deficits. Overall, the aim of systematic risk evaluation is to improve the quality, efficiency 
and transparency of decision-making. The risk evaluation exercise results in four generic types:
Figure 4: Risk classification matrix
Quadrant A 
•  Risks lack sufficient information to be analysed with vendor models but can be appraised through standardized
   in-house tools that are strongly grounded in contextual judgement. 
•  Information that supports contextual judgement can be provided by email and phone.
Quadrant B 
•  These risks lend themselves to strong analytic assessment, typically through the use of standardized vendor
   models weighted according to standardized in-house loadings for particular regions and perils so that these
   may be uniformly applied to vendor models.
•  Email is sufficient interaction to transact on these risks.
Quadrant C 
•  These risks are best dealt with by tailoring vendor models to perform information-rich analysis that is loaded
   for factors arising from contextual judgement of both the risk and the cedent. 
•  The complexity of the structure necessitates direct interaction, even where information is high, indicating either 
   phone or face to support evaluation of the risk.
Quadrant D 
•  These risks are difficult to assess in any standardised form, but should still be analysable through a range of  
  in-house tools. Hence, they lend themselves to evaluation through tailored in-house tools.
•  Face-to-face interaction adds most value as it enables the risk to be evaluated and a structure for reinsurance
   cover to be generated through discussion between a broker and underwriter.
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Recommendations for evaluating risks
Enhance analytic assessment: 
•  Systematize information processing to enhance comparability 
•  Standardize the weighting of vendor models where appropriate to particular types of perils and regions
Strengthen contextual judgement: 
•  Develop measures and weightings of contextual factors where possible
•  Systematically record both soft and measurable contextual factors of a risk in an in-house database 
Evaluate risks according to their relative information quality and the degree of programme complexity.
Standardize risk analysis where appropriate, using either in-house tools or vendor models, whilst ensuring that 
tailored analysis can be used for those risks to which they are most suited.
3.4 Selective application of face-to-face and electronic interaction
As face-to-face interaction is a costly resource, it should be used where it adds value and substituted with email 
or phone where these are equally valuable. Figure 5 is a process model that indicates those phases in the trading 
process when face, phone or email adds value. Client meetings should involve face-to-face interaction, as face is 
valuable for establishing trust; particularly in the early phases of a relationship (see Section 3.2).  The submission 
should always be emailed to minimize duplication of paper and electronic information. The extent to which 
submission requires an accompanying face or phone discussion depends upon the information quality and relative 
complexity of the risk (see Section 3.3). 
During the quoting phase, interaction varies:
•  Simple risks, or those with good information, can be largely transacted by email with a phone call to garner 
   market intelligence about the ball park in which to position the quote. 
•  Face can be very valuable when the risk is complex and/or there is an information deficit. Here face-to-face 
   interaction enables underwriter-broker negotiation in order to structure the deal and derive an appropriate 
   quote for the market conditions and nature of the client. 
When the firm order terms (FOT) are ready, the need for direct interaction declines. There are three main 
indicators for varying interaction in this phase. 
•  If this is a significant decision in terms of size and capacity for the reinsurer, a phone conversation may help  
   to establish specific aspects of the line and layer, particularly the likely signing. 
•  If there is a substantial downward price discrepancy between the quoted price and the FOT a telephone call can 
   establish any reasons that might still make the risk favourable to write, the potential for any changes in price, or 
   the size of line and layers that the reinsurer might want to write given the lower price. 
•  For risks that are relatively small in the reinsurer’s portfolio and those where the FOTs are relatively consistent 
   with the quoted price, there is no reason for anything other than email interaction. 
Finally, there is very little value in anything other than email interaction for processing the slip, which is simply 
the logical end to a business transaction. Thus, as shown in Figure 5, face is a variable of the trading process that 
does not need to be uniformly applied.
Figure 5: Selective use of face-to-face and electronic interaction
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The value of face declines throughout the trading process
Face adds:
•  Most value in the early phases of the trading process, particularly at the pre-submission phase of meeting  
   the client; 
•  Value in the submission and quoting phases of complex risks or those with an information-deficit; 
•  Little value in the final phases of the underwriter process, particularly in processing the slip.
Section 4 Recommendations: Modularisation
In this section, the trading process is broken down into modules of activity, and best practices for brokers 
and reinsurers are identified in each module. These best practices bring together our recommendations for 
relationship evaluation (Section 3.2), risk appraisal (Section 3.3) and selective application of face, phone and 
email interaction (Section 3.4). Modularisation pinpoints problems in specific stages of the workflow, improves 
process management and generates links between related activities. Reinsurance firms and broking houses can 
use this modularisation process as a guide to evaluate and/or change their current practices.
Modularising the reinsurance trading process
Modularisation ensures that risk trading decisions are put on a solid and transparent information basis with clear 
feedback loops between each phase of the trading process. In order to assist with critical evaluation of current 
practice as well as subsequent change implementation, we provide an overview map of the entire trading process 
(Figure 6) and then detail the individual modules in each phase and how they interlink (Figures 7-11). 
Figure 6 maps out the entire risk trading process according to its five constituent phases: Pre-Submission, 
Submission, Quoting, Authorisation and Quality Control. This figure: 
•  Illustrates the specific modules that constitute each phase, the activities that they involve and how 
   they interlink.
•  Differentiates between modules that describe General Activities, Appraisal Points and Mandatory Gateways 
   in each phase.
•  Demonstrates that the risk trading process is cyclical, as the review of placement decisions and processes
   from one renewal season creates a feedback loop that inputs into the next season. 
•  Shows that Quality Control needs to be a distinct phase of the process that will facilitate regulatory compliance
   and enhance process optimisation, information sharing and portfolio management.
Each of the modules is denoted by a different shape, for easy identification of its generic purpose, as follows:
General activities describe those operations necessary to move the 
trading process along. Outputs from one activity form inputs for the next. 
This type of module includes relationship evaluation, client meetings, 
information management, broker preparation submission and the 
submission itself.
Appraisal points denote those junctions at which underwriters consciously 
decide how to move the process along most efficiently. Based on an 
evaluation of, for instance, the purpose and type of client relationships, 
they select a course of action from a range of possible alternatives, such 
as type of client engagement.
Mandatory gateways highlight the ‘hoops to jump through’. They describe 
activities that should occur before the risk trading process can enter the 
next phase. Putting in place mechanisms which ensure every piece of 
business passes all mandatory gateways, strengthens systematic risk 
evaluation, improves transparency of decision-making, creates a reliable 
audit trail and generally improves compliance with regulatory demands.
General activities
Appraisal Point
Mandatory Gateway
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Each of Figures 7 to 11 focuses in detail on one of the five phases of the risk trading process identified in Figure 
6. They describe the individual modules for each phase as well as different ways of performing them based on 
assessments made at previous appraisal points. They also identify different module-specific best practices that 
apply to either underwriters or brokers. Colour coding in the figures is related to the colour coding of the original 
sections in which we developed recommendations for change, so that it is easy to refer to these corresponding 
guidelines for relationship evaluation (Section 3.2), risk appraisal (Section 3.3) and selective application of face, 
phone and email interaction (Section 3.4). These process maps are intended to be a guide for reinsurers and 
brokers in evaluating and potentially changing their current practices. 
Pre-submission
Pre-submission covers all those activities at the beginning of a renewal season that precede the preparation 
and hand-over of submission documentation. Every renewal season should start with a relationship evaluation 
that results in the scoring of particular relationships (see Section 3.2). The composite score feeds into the first 
appraisal point at which brokers and reinsurers determine the appropriate form of client meeting based on their 
relationship objective. The meeting format, in turn, generates particular types of information that is relevant 
to those objectives. Subsequent information management should aim to systematically record and store the 
information from client meetings, making it widely and easily accessible throughout the company. Finally, for 
management information and transparency purposes, it should be mandatory to log this appraisal in a formal 
evaluation record before transitioning to the submission phase.
Submission
The submission phase starts with the submission preparation, which is a broker activity. It then moves to 
appraising the risk for information quality and structural complexity (see Section 3.3). This enables brokers and 
reinsurers to determine the extent of standardization or tailoring a risk is likely to need and, hence, the extent 
of direct interaction that they will need. Finally, submission processing should include the systematic logging of 
incoming submissions in electronic databases in order to ensure a rigorous audit trail. Once incoming submissions 
are logged they can be forwarded to modellers for analytical assessment, ideally accompanied by explicit 
guidelines about any specific factors to account for in the analysis. 
Quoting
The quoting phase starts with processing the analysis when underwriters receive it from the in-house analysts. 
Receipt of the modelling triggers appraisal of the analytical output in terms of complexity and need for 
restructuring of the deal, which inform the extent to which face, phone or email broker-underwriter interaction 
is needed for decision making (see Section 3.4). These analyses and discussions then inform formal quoting, 
during which underwriters establish their quote price (or price indication for non-quoting markets), secure the 
appropriate level of underwriting authority and submit their formal quote electronically. Again, it should be 
mandatory at the end of this trading phase to produce formal documentation of the underwriting decision, 
together with key information on analytic assessment and contextual judgement underpinning the decision.
Authorisation
For brokers, the authorisation phase begins by collecting and processing quotes. They present quotes to the 
client and agree on firm order terms (FOTs). Processing FOTs then constitutes the start of the authorisation 
phase for underwriters. During appraisal of FOTs underwriters assess the significance of i) any discrepancies 
with the quoted price; ii) their line size in relation to capacity (see Section 3.3); and iii) the relative value of the 
cedent (see Section 3.2). This appraisal determines the extent to which broker interaction is likely to add value 
for authorisation. While the deal is done with the written line, contract certainty must be established as soon 
as possible, as a mandatory gateway, and the signed line should be logged promptly for effective exposure and 
capacity management.
Quality Control
Our study showed that there is typically little space for systematic quality control once a risk is written or  
a renewal season comes to an end. Process reviews of how deals flow through the company are sporadic. 
Risk reviews usually occur after a risk has been written, are sometimes suspended altogether when deadlines 
loom, and generally do not provide serious scrutiny of written and declined risks against any wider client, risk or 
portfolio evaluation. However, on those occasions where risk reviews do occur, even in a relatively ad hoc fashion, 
they provide valuable points for learning and knowledge transfer from the individual underwriter or broker on 
the risk to other members of the team. If they were also systematically recorded, they could be added to and 
accessed on an annual basis, so building a knowledge repository. In the interest of: compliance; management 
information quality; process management; learning opportunities; and knowledge transfer, we recommend that 
firms should integrate these quality control modules into the risk trading process. This approach to quality control 
also facilitates portfolio analysis completing our last mandatory gateway. This gateway establishes the feedback 
loop that transforms the outputs of one renewal season into inputs for the following one.
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Figure 6: Modularised process map of the risk trading process
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Figure 7: Phase 1: Pre-submission
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Figure 8: Phase 2: Submission
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Figure 9: Phase 3: Quoting
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Figure 10: Phase 4: Authorisation
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Figure 11: Phase 5: Quality Control
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Conclusion
The reinsurance industry is in a period of transition arising from technological change, convergence in  
global markets, and an increase in technical bases for evaluating risk. These changes are shifting it from  
a ‘craft industry’ based on individual skills and relationships, to a more professional set of transferrable skills 
and business-to-business relationships. However, the shift to professionalization is still occurring largely through 
natural evolution, rather than purposeful strategic change. The recommendations from this study can support 
reinsurance firms and broking houses in systematically strengthening their trading practices in order to  
capitalise on the opportunities afforded by industry-level change. 
Specifically, they can better evaluate relationships, using a portfolio approach that enables them to allocate 
attention, resources and effort according to the value of any specific relationship. Risks can be classified 
according to the extent to which they require standardised or tailored approaches to analysis and pricing.  
This will ensure that the best quality of decision-making is applied to those risks where it is most warranted. 
Finally, face-to-face interaction is a scarce resource that should be conserved for those parts of the trading 
process where it can add the most value. The process models developed in this report enable brokers and 
underwriters to distinguish when it is most effective to apply face-to-face or electronic interaction throughout  
the trading process. 
These specific recommendations can be strengthened by incorporating them into a modularised process that 
enables clear links between the different activities in the trading process. Effective modularisation will support 
the growing professionalization of the reinsurance industry.    
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